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To Dignity Through the
Back Door: Tsilhqot’in and the
Aboriginal Title Test
Andrée Boisselle*

I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important aspects of the Supreme Court of Canada’s
judgment in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia1 consists in the
clarification of the test for Aboriginal title. The judgment settles a
controversy that had arisen following the Court’s decisions in R. v.
Marshall; R. v. Bernard2 regarding the degree of historical use of the
land consistent with the recognition of Aboriginal title. Setting aside the
notion that title might only be established by Aboriginal groups on the
“definite tracts of land” “intensively used” by their ancestors, the Court
adopts a territorial approach to title, consistent with the fact that areas
used intensively for sustenance and dwelling purposes are typically
enclosed within a wider land base to which a given Indigenous society
has a long-standing, living relationship, shaping its culture and its
identity. This article critically examines the Court’s clarification of the
test. Beyond the important victory that the outcome of the case presents
for Indigenous peoples across Canada, a closer look at the Court’s
reasoning exposes some of the troubling features of Aboriginal title
doctrine, as well as other potentially deeply transformative features of
this doctrine, as it now stands.
On the first count, I argue that while the Court suggests that the issue of
title “must be approached from both the common law perspective and the
Aboriginal perspective”, it still fails to draw on Indigenous laws as a source
of authoritative standards shaping the content of the title test itself. The test
*
I am grateful to Kent McNeil and Kerry Wilkins for reading a draft of this article and
providing very helpful feedback. Needless to say, any shortcomings or errors are entirely my own.
1
[2014] S.C.J. No. 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257, 2014 SCC 44 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in”].
2
[2005] S.C.J. No. 44, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Marshall and Bernard”].
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remains unequivocally grounded in Euro-Canadian, common law norms,
illustrating the difficulty of overcoming the Canadian legal system’s
deep-rooted ethnocentricity. As such, Tsilhqot’in inherits and perpetuates the
profoundly skewed conceptual apparatus of Canadian jurisprudence framing
the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Crown.
However, I also believe that Tsilhqot’in effects a powerful resetting of
the conversation on Indigenous land rights in Canada. This is not only
because of the outcome in this particular instance, but for a deeper
doctrinal reason. Indeed, one of the Court’s most important contributions
in Tsilhqot’in lies in its decisive association of the notion of “prior
occupation” of the land  the main legal issue underlying the title test 
with the historical control of the land rather than with the manner or
intensity of its use. This amounts to a significant recharacterization of the
evidentiary issue underlying title claims, since it focuses on the exercise of
jurisdiction by Indigenous polities on their territory, rather than on their
factual survival on the land. The Court’s clarification of the meaning of
occupancy directs the evidentiary focus on the political and legal agency of
Indigenous societies on their traditional territories, and draws attention to
the norms governing the historical recognition of territorial boundaries
between and among Indigenous societies. Thus, although the Court relied
solely on common law precedents to give meaning to the norm of
occupation, its restatement of the title test in Tsilhqot’in effectively takes
Indigenous normativity to the heart of the test, decisively moving
Aboriginal rights jurisprudence past “terra nullius” thinking.
The arguments I develop in this article each correspond to a problem
besetting Aboriginal title jurisprudence. The first is that this jurisprudence
does not afford equal weight to Euro-Canadian and Indigenous
normative commitments in establishing what relevantly qualifies as
“prior occupation” of the land. The Supreme Court does not improve the
record on that issue in Tsilhqot’in, missing an important opportunity to
decolonize the Canadian legal imagination and to set Aboriginal rights
jurisprudence on a truly reconciliatory path. The second problem,
more technical, regards the skewed application of the common law
norm of occupation: if the content of that norm is to draw solely on
Euro-Canadian references and precedents, then it should at least be
applied consistently across the common law rather than be given a sui
generis interpretation in the context of Aboriginal rights that entrenches
ethnocentric double standards. On this count, Tsilhqot’in represents an
important doctrinal victory with far-ranging positive implications for
Indigenous peoples in Canada.
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1. Privileging Euro-Canadian Over Indigenous Normative
Frameworks in Establishing What Relevantly Qualifies as “Prior
Occupation” of the Land
The skewing of the normative dialogue on the respective rights and
responsibilities of Indigenous and settler societies in favour of EuroCanadian law is an old and pervasive feature of Canadian Aboriginal
law. The Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Van der Peet,3 in 1996, could
be considered its first attempt at addressing the role of law as a crucial
mechanism of colonial dispossession. Implicitly acknowledging that the
unilateral imposition of foreign laws on Indigenous societies was unjust
and had to change, the Court stated that the delineation of Aboriginal
rights recognized and affirmed at section 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
19824 had to “take into account the perspective of the aboriginal people
claiming the right. … while at the same time taking into account the
perspective of the common law” such that “[t]rue reconciliation will,
equally, place weight on each.”5 However, the Court proceeded in the
same breath to insert a major caveat into this reconciliatory aspiration:
taking into consideration “the Aboriginal perspective” had to be done
without straining “the Canadian legal and constitutional structure”.6 In
other words, the Court purports to recalibrate a relationship characterized
by dispossession, oppression and assimilation by recognizing the “prior
occupation” of the land by Indigenous people, but somehow without
coming to terms with their full integrity as societies  sovereign over
themselves and their lands, in a nation-to-nation relationship with the
Canadian state.7

3

[1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.).
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Constitution”].
5
Id., at paras. 49-50.
6
Id., at para. 49; see also Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997]
3 S.C.R. 1010, at para. 82 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”].
7
In R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] S.C.J. No. 20, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821 (S.C.C.), the Court
illustrated what it meant by framing the Aboriginal perspective so as not to strain the Canadian
constitutional structure. The Aboriginal appellant was convicted for organizing gambling activities
on reserve, in keeping with his band’s regulation of those activities but contrary to the Canadian
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. His attempt to invoke s. 35(1) of the Constitution to protect his
band’s right to self-govern, including its right to manage its reserve lands as it saw fit, was rejected
by the Supreme Court as casting its inquiry “at a level of excessive generality” (at para. 27). The
Court proceeded to recharacterize the claim as “the right to participate in, and to regulate, high
stakes gambling activities on the reservation” (at para. 26), to then rule that the evidence did not
meet the threshold established in Van der Peet for a right to be protected by s. 35(1): it did not
demonstrate that gambling “was of central significance to the distinctive culture” of the Ojibwa.
4
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A year later, in Delgamuukw,8 the Court began to navigate the
tension inherent in this scheme which seeks reconciliation without strain.
Faced with the challenge of theorizing Aboriginal title, the Court
establishes that it is grounded “both in the common law and in the
aboriginal perspective on land”.9 However, while this principle of
placing “equal weight” on Euro-Canadian and Aboriginal perspectives
on land quickly becomes a leitmotiv of the Court’s Aboriginal rights and
title jurisprudence, the manner in which it effectively conceives of and
gives voice to each of the “dual perspectives” actually maintains
Indigenous polities and their laws in a position of inferiority.10
In Delgamuukw, the Court locates the source of Aboriginal title in
the occupation of land before the British assertion of sovereignty. The
main onus on an Indigenous community claiming title over a piece of
land will therefore be to demonstrate that it had occupied the territory
within which that land was located for an indefinite period of time before
the date of British sovereignty assertion over that specific part of the
developing Dominion. The other two criteria that the Court enunciates as
part of the title test  continuous occupation since British sovereignty,
and exclusive occupation by the claimant group  are certainly also
relevant to the establishment of title.11 But the main battleground, in
Delgamuukw as in Tsilhqot’in, consisted in the conceptualization of
occupation itself, and it is on this central idea that the Supreme Court’s
In contrast, the Court’s jurisprudence shelters the settler state’s assertions of sovereignty from
scrutiny. In R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at para. 49 (S.C.C.), Dickson
C.J.C. writes: “while British policy towards the native population was based on respect for their right
to occupy their traditional lands, a proposition to which the Royal Proclamation of 1763 bears
witness, there was from the outset never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and
indeed the underlying title, to such lands vested in the Crown”. See Kent McNeil, “Indigenous
Nations and the Legal Relativity of European Claims to Territorial Sovereignty in North America”,
in Sandra Tomsons and Lorraine Mayer, eds., Philosophy and Aboriginal Rights: Critical Dialogues
(Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2013), at 242 [hereinafter “McNeil, ‘Indigenous
Nations’”].
8
Delgamuukw, supra, note 6.
9
Id., at para. 147.
10
See John Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia” (1999) 37:3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 537 [hereinafter “Borrows”].
11
With regard to continuity: if the claimant group does not occupy its traditional territory
anymore because it was displaced or dispossessed post-assertion of sovereignty, its title may still be
recognized but only give rise to financial compensation rather than repossession of the land in
question. Regarding exclusivity: if occupation was shared with another group, title may be
recognized if those groups can demonstrate the exclusivity of their joint occupation as against other
people. A declaration of title in such a case would imply the continuation of their shared possession
and jurisdiction over the title area. See Kent McNeil, “Exclusive Occupation and Joint Aboriginal
Title” (2015) 48:3 U.B.C. L.R. [hereinafter “McNeil, ‘Exclusive Occupation’”].
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reasoning in both of these seminal cases relies unduly on the common
law, conveniently glossing over Indigenous political and legal autonomy.
Indeed, if the Court took seriously the parity suggested by its
acknowledgment that true reconciliation requires that “equal weight” be
placed on “Aboriginal perspectives” and on the common law, it would
seek to formulate standards derived from a true normative dialogue
between Euro-Canadian and Indigenous perspectives. In other words, to
be on par with the common law, the relevant “Aboriginal perspectives”
would have to be derived from the Indigenous laws pertaining to the
manner in which they asserted their collective authority over the land.
The Court’s driving inquiry would be to find the place where those
respective normative universes share actual standards.
Instead, although it recognized that the “relationship between
common law and pre-existing systems of Aboriginal law”12 plays a role
in grounding Aboriginal title, the Court in Delgamuukw assigned very
different roles to the legal traditions facing each other in that
relationship. The normative source of Aboriginal title, Lamer C.J.C.
explains, is the “physical fact of occupation, which derives from
the common law principle that occupation is proof of possession in
law”.13 There is no reference to the contribution of Gitksan and
Wet’suwet’en law in establishing that standard, and therefore seemingly
no normative value ascribed to such a contribution. Chief Justice Lamer
notes that while the parties agreed on appeal “that proof of historic
occupation was required to make out a claim to aboriginal title,”14 they
disagreed on what should count toward such proof.15 But rather than
proceeding to examine Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en norms regarding
occupation to determine how they might inform the Canadian standard
underlying title, the Chief Justice’s reasoning then reveals the
discrepancy between the roles he reserves to each legal tradition.
“If” an Aboriginal society had laws in relation to land, begins
Lamer C.J.C., such laws will help to establish the “aboriginal perspective
on the occupation of their lands”. Such perspective cannot, however, be
“gleaned” exclusively from Indigenous laws. The status of those laws is
12

Delgamuukw, supra, note 6, at para. 114.
Id.
14
Id., at para. 146.
15
The Crown asserted that in order to establish Aboriginal title, occupation should amount
to the physical occupation of the land in question. The Gitksan argued that Aboriginal title arose at
least in part from and “should reflect the pattern of land holdings” under their own laws: see id., at
paras. 146-147.
13
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on par with other elements of the “practices, customs and traditions of
Aboriginal peoples” and must be assessed as a part of this whole.16 As
Lamer C.J.C. continues, the relegation of Indigenous laws to the role of
historical facts among other pieces of material evidence, shaping what
the Court calls “the Aboriginal perspective”, gets ever clearer. Outlining
the norm of occupation, that is, what constitutes sufficient occupation to
ground title, the Chief Justice draws on common law standards “ranging
from the construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of
fields to ... exploiting its resources”.17 Relevant Indigenous laws,
including historical Indigenous system of land tenure and land use, shall
serve alongside “the group’s size, manner of life, material resources, and
technological abilities”18 as well as geographical information detailing
“the character of the lands claimed”19 to provide what seemingly
amounts to a mere context of application for the common law norm
of sufficient occupation. In other words, laws on the Indigenous side of
the equation do not, for the purposes of interpreting the standard of
occupation, actually play a direct normative role.
This reading of Delgamuukw is confirmed in the next major
judgment of the Supreme Court on Aboriginal title in the sister cases of
Marshall and Bernard, where the majority (now led by McLachlin C.J.C.)
describes in the following terms its methodology for assessing the title
claim at issue:
The Court’s task in evaluating a claim for an aboriginal right is to
examine the pre-sovereignty aboriginal practice and translate that
practice, as faithfully and objectively as it can, into a modern legal
right. … The Court must consider the pre-sovereignty practice from the
perspective of the aboriginal people. But in translating it to a common
law right, the Court must also consider the European perspective; the
nature of the right at common law must be examined to determine
whether a particular aboriginal practice fits it.20

In this “exercise in translating aboriginal practices to modern
rights”,21 as the majority calls it, the role of the “Aboriginal perspective” 
i.e., of the evidence adduced concerning the Indigenous material and
normative universe pre-British sovereignty assertion  is to enable the
16
17
18
19
20
21

Id., at para. 148.
Id., at para. 149.
Id.
Id.
Marshall and Bernard, supra, note 2, at para. 48 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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judges to take what they conceive of as a culturally sensitive approach to
the determination of Aboriginal rights. For the majority, this requires that
the “translation” exercise “not be conducted in a formalistic or narrow
way. The Court should take a generous view of the aboriginal practice
and should not insist on exact conformity to the precise legal parameters
of the common law right.”22 But what remains at issue “is whether the
[Aboriginal] practice corresponds to the core [common law] concepts of
the legal right claimed”.23 This is a very different exercise than that of
articulating the parameters of a collectivity’s territorial authority,
speaking equally to European and Indigenous sources of legitimacy.
Two of the Supreme Court justices in Marshall and Bernard, Lebel J.
and Fish J., disown their colleagues’ reasoning on that basis. While
concurring with the majority on the result (i.e., that the evidence offered
in both cases was not sufficient to establish Aboriginal title), they
denounce an approach “too narrowly focused on common law concepts
relating to property interests”.24 They write:
The role of the aboriginal perspective cannot be simply to help in the
interpretation of aboriginal practices in order to assess whether they
conform to common law concepts of title. The aboriginal perspective
shapes the very concept of aboriginal title. “Aboriginal law should not
just be received as evidence that Aboriginal peoples did something in
the past on a piece of land. It is more than evidence: it is actually law.
And so, there should be some way to bring to the decision-making
process those laws that arise from the standards of the indigenous
people before the court.”25

Tsilhqot’in presented the Court with a new opportunity to restate its
theoretical and methodological approach along the lines articulated by
Lebel J. and Fish J., ushering a jurisprudence based on normative dialogue
between equally respected legal orders. This is what placing “equal weight”
on Euro-Canadian and Indigenous perspectives, respecting the inherent
dignity of Indigenous societies, and moving beyond the colonial unilateral
imposition of Euro-Canadian terms simply requires. Instead, the Court
decided to continue on the path it has treaded since Delgamuukw – stating a
powerful egalitarian principle, but shying away from giving it real effect, as
if doing so might “strain the Canadian legal and constitutional order.”
22

Id.
Id.
24
Id., at para. 110.
25
Id., at para. 130, quoting John Borrows, “Creating an Indigenous Legal Community”
(2005) 50 McGill L.J. 153, at 173.
23
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Indeed, the Court reiterates in Tsilhqot’in the principle whereby
“[t]he dual perspectives of the common law and of the Aboriginal group
bear equal weight in evaluating a claim for Aboriginal title.”26 The Court
then acknowledges that in Marshall and Bernard, it set out the standard
of occupation by sole reference to the common law, but claims that this
is compatible with giving its due to the Aboriginal perspective on what
occupation amounts to:
The Court in Marshall; Bernard confirmed that nomadic and seminomadic groups could establish title to land, provided they establish
sufficient physical possession, which is a question of fact. … While the
issue was framed in terms of whether the common law test for possession
was met, the Court did not resile from the need to consider the
perspective of the Aboriginal group in question; sufficient occupation is a
‘question of fact, depending on all the circumstances, in particular the
nature of the land and the manner in which it is commonly used’.27

In effect, the Court is saying that giving “equal weight” to the
perspective of the common law and of the Aboriginal group is
satisfactorily achieved by treating the first as law and the second as the
factual context relevant to determining whether or not the legal standard
has been met.
This reading is confirmed by the fact that in Tsilhqot’in, the Court
clarifies the standard of occupation by sole reference to the common
law  as I will now discuss, turning to the content of the standard itself.
I will also show that although the judgment fails to put Euro-Canadian
and Indigenous law explicitly on the same footing, the Court’s
interpretation of the common law standard of occupation shapes the title
test in a manner that, in practice if not in principle, introduces into
Canadian law some of the respect due to Indigenous laws and to the preexisting sovereignty of Indigenous nations. In other words, Tsilhqot’in
leaves us with a test for title that affirms the inherent dignity of
Indigenous societies  if only through the backdoor.
2. Dual Perspectives or Double Standards?
At issue in Tsilhqot’in was whether occupation consists in the
“regular and exclusive use” of a given territory, or in a more stringent
standard, the “intensive use of definite tracts of land”. Applying the
26
27

Tsilhqot’in, supra, note 1, at para. 14.
Id., at para. 44, quoting Marshall and Bernard, supra, note 2, at para. 66.

(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d)

TO DIGNITY THROUGH THE BACK DOOR

35

former led Vickers J., the trial judge, to affirm the Tsilhqot’in
people’s title to a portion of the claim area as well as to a small area
outside the claim area, totalling less than 5 per cent of what the
Tsilhqot’in regard as their traditional territory. 28 The British Columbia
Court of Appeal invalidated this conclusion, holding the correct legal
standard to be the second one, effectively reducing the possible ambit
of Aboriginal title to specific dwelling or harvesting sites  the
equivalent of “postage stamp” areas within the Tsilhqot’in people’s
traditional territory. To understand the significance of the Supreme
Court’s clarification of what counts as “occupation” at common law,
it is useful to re-examine the source of the divergence on this point
between the trial judge (with whom the Supreme Court concurred)
and the Court of Appeal.
The resolution of this divergence by the Supreme Court can again be
traced back to Delgamuukw. In that case, Lamer C.J.C. relied on
Professor Kent McNeil’s seminal study, Common Law Aboriginal Title,29
to expose the private property principles that could be used to ground
Aboriginal title at common law:
Professor McNeil has convincingly argued that at common law, the fact
of physical occupation is proof of possession at law, which in turn will
ground title to the land …. Physical occupation may be established in a
variety of ways, ranging from the construction of dwellings through
cultivation and enclosure of fields to regular use of definite tracts of
land for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its resources … 30

This passage states the law correctly, insofar as possession does
ground title at common law and can be established through occupation.
However, a wide range of manifestations of possession and types of
occupation have been accepted as grounding title at common law. The
suggestion in the above passage that occupation means “physical”
occupation, connoting the living presence of people on the specific
parcel claimed, or their active presence mediated by artefacts indicating
their “regular use” of the land, is not supported at common law.
Requiring physical presence and regular use of the land amounts to
applying a much higher standard to Aboriginal title claims than that

The claim area amounted to about 5 per cent of Tsilhqot’in traditional territory. The other
95 per cent were not in issue in the case.
29
Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
30
Delgamuukw, supra, note 6, at para. 149.
28
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warranted by the jurisprudence. Summarizing the case law on this issue,
Professor McNeil notes:
At least as important as physical acts on or in relation to the land is the
intention to hold and use the land for one’s own purposes and to exclude
others who have not been given permission to enter. This is why placing
markers or blazing trees around the perimeter of the land demonstrate
occupation, even if the land is not otherwise occupied or used. In other
words, the occupier is not obliged to use the land in any particular way, as
long as the intention to occupy is present and manifest through public acts
in relation to the land and no one else is in actual occupation.31

Professor McNeil adds:
At common law, effective control can be demonstrated by regular use
of the land, but does not depend on use of specific sites. Indeed, the
common law cases clearly reveal that control of, or even notice of
intention to control, the perimeter of a tract of land is sufficient to
establish occupation of all the land within the perimeter.32

In other words, what “occupation” means for the purposes of
acquiring possessory title at common law is only “effective control”. The
norm has a subjective element  the intention to hold the land for one’s
own purposes  and an objective one  the capacity to concretize one’s
intention, and the signalling of one’s intention to make it outwardly
knowable. This exhausts the content of the norm. All other criteria, such
as “physical presence on” or “use of” the land are evidentiary
derivatives: accepted ways of demonstrating possession/occupation.
After the emphasis placed by Lamer C.J.C. on “physical” occupation,
the majority’s approach to the notion of occupation slipped further toward
replacing its central criterion, effective control, with that of regular use, and
even more stringently, of intensive use, in Marshall and Bernard. Witness
the slippage in the following passage of the majority’s judgment:
In summary, exclusive possession in the sense of intention and capacity
to control is required to establish aboriginal title. Typically, this is
established by showing regular occupancy or use of definite tracts
of land for hunting, fishing or exploiting resources: Delgamuukw, at
para. 149. Less intensive uses may give rise to different rights.33

Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title in Canada: Site-Specific or Territorial?”, July 1, 2013,
online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294552> [hereinafter “McNeil, ‘Aboriginal’”], at 12.
32
Id., at 13.
33
Marshall and Bernard, supra, note 2, at para. 70 (emphasis added).
31
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As a result, the Mi’kmaq saw their claim to title denied in Marshall
and Bernard, as the evidence presented regarding their connection to
their traditional territory did not meet what the majority deemed to be the
requisite intensity of land use. Writing for the British Columbia Court of
Appeal in Tsilhqot’in, Groberman J. latched on to this notion of intensive
use and turned it into the primary evidentiary threshold that claimants
must meet to ground Aboriginal title.
As Professor McNeil pointed out, this was not only unsubstantiated
at common law, but actually entrenched a double standard. Most
common law precedents discussing the issue of sufficient occupation, he
explained, involve cases of adverse possession. This means that the
standard of occupation that deems “effective control” of the land over the
statutory limitation period as sufficient to ground possessory title arose in
the context of wrongdoing. It allows those who occupy land they did not
originally own to acquire a possessory title over it by ousting the true
owner. Since Aboriginal title claimants typically seek title over lands
they have rightfully occupied for an indefinite period of time prior to the
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, they should be held to a lower standard
than wrongdoers. Instead, requiring them to prove the intensive use of
their lands in order to see their title recognized effectively held them to a
higher standard.34 A double standard unfair to Aboriginal claimants was
thus threatening to take hold in the case law following the Court of
Appeal’s judgment in Tsilhqot’in, based on the above reading of
Delgamuukw and of Marshall and Bernard.
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Tsilhqot’in puts an end to this
budding line of jurisprudence. Firmly re-establishing the criterion of
control at the core of the notion of occupation sufficient to ground title at
common law, the Court even cuts out the reference to “physical”
occupation in its quotation of the famous Delgamuukw passage
reproduced above.35 The Court forcefully states:
The common law perspective imports the idea of possession and
control of the lands. At common law, possession extends beyond sites
that are physically occupied, like a house, to surrounding lands that are
used and over which effective control is exercised.36

34
35
36

McNeil, “Aboriginal”, supra, note 31, at 13-14.
See Tsilhqot’in, supra, note 1, at para. 37.
Id., at para. 36.
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Although the Court does refer to the use of the land, this notion of
use recedes to its proper place as evidence that may be offered toward
fulfilling the actual legal criterion of effective control:
To sufficiently occupy the land for purposes of title, the Aboriginal
group in question must show that it has historically acted in a way that
would communicate to third parties that it held the land for its own
purposes. This standard does not demand notorious or visible use akin
to proving a claim for adverse possession, but neither can the
occupation be purely subjective or internal. There must be evidence of a
strong presence on or over the land claimed, manifesting itself in acts
of occupation that could reasonably be interpreted as demonstrating
that the land in question belonged to, was controlled by, or was under
the exclusive stewardship of the claimant group.37

In summary, the Court thus affirms that it is the control of the land,
rather than the manner and intensity of its use, that must remain the focus
of the assessment of occupation. Even though this simply restates the
existing common law standard, and does not draw upon Indigenous
normativity to ostensibly ground the legitimacy of the title test equally in
Indigenous legality,38 the clarification of the norm still has important
implications. Indeed, the nature of the evidence required to prove control
over the territory leads us onto a terrain implying a much more
egalitarian, nation-to-nation relationship between the settler state and
Indigenous claimant groups than the one underlying Canadian Aboriginal
law so far.
First, affirming the notion of control as the central requirement of
possessory title brings the different elements of the test of occupation set
37

Id., at para. 38 (emphasis added).
As discussed in the previous section, the Supreme Court views the “Aboriginal
perspective” on the land as relevant, but considers it at the level of factual evidence serving to assess
whether the common law standard has been met. It is interesting to note in that respect that the
Supreme Court explicitly ties the examination of the use of the land to the role of the Aboriginal
perspective in applying the test for title. All kinds of uses are relevant evidence to bring to the
demonstration of effective control of the land by the claimant group:
a culturally sensitive approach suggests that regular use of territories for hunting, fishing,
trapping and foraging is “sufficient” use to ground Aboriginal title, provided that such
use, on the facts of a particular case, evinces an intention on the part of the Aboriginal
group to hold or possess the land in a manner comparable to what would be required to
establish title at common law (id., at para. 42).
The trial judge, Vickers J., assessed the use by the Tsilhqot’in people of a large number of sites
on the territory to which they claimed title, and determined that such use was regular and exclusive.
The Supreme Court does not disturb that finding, given that the norm applied was “consistent with
the correct legal test” and that no palpable and overriding error was shown in the factual conclusions.
(Id., at paras. 51-52).
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out in Delgamuukw in close proximity. In particular, the element labelled
as “sufficient occupation” now appears as either equivalent to or
subsumed under the element of “exclusive occupation”. The Court
defines the latter in very similar terms as occupation tout court: “the
intention and capacity to control the land”.39 On that basis, it is fair to
think that if an Indigenous group demonstrates its exclusive historical
stewardship over a given territory, it needs to offer no further evidence
with respect to the “sufficiency” of its occupation.40
This conceptual tightening redirects the tone and the evidentiary focus
of the inquiry. The very concept of sufficient occupation suggests a
threshold. It invites a comparison between Indigenous and Euro-Canadian
conceptions of land and property that veers easily into the ethnocentric
filtering of Indigenous societies’ relationship to their lands through
common law conceptions of property. The vague requirement that “cultural
sensitivity” be shown in assessing whether the common law threshold is
met does not adequately address the inherent bias of this framework.
An inquiry revolving around the proof of control presents a
significantly different framework. Redirecting the evidentiary focus on
Indigenous societies’ historical recognition of each other’s territorial
boundaries, it purports to give effect to the international relations that
prevailed within the Indigenous world when the Crown’s claim to power
on Indigenous peoples and their territories entered the diplomatic equation.
Looking into the boundaries that had currency among Indigenous nations
at that time and accepting them into Canadian law means that the state
agrees to see Indigenous polities as they saw (and still see) each other 
nations with jurisdiction over themselves and their respective territories 
and to ascribe social power to that Indigenous characterization.41
Taking the so-called “Aboriginal perspective” into consideration
acquires a different connotation under the framework focusing on the
proof of boundaries and exclusive control. It certainly still serves to
avoid ethnocentric assumptions, but since the goal is to give interIndigenous relations and recognition direct effect in Canadian law,
Aboriginal practices have an immediate normative weight they did not
39

Id., at para. 48.
This realization is supported by the Supreme Court’s statement, early in its Tsilhqot’in
judgment, to the effect that the three elements of the title test  the sufficient, continuous and
exclusive occupation of the land  should not be considered independently, but as “related aspects
of a single concept” (id., at para. 31).
41
Accepting the inter-Indigenous settlement of overlapping claims in the intervening period as
resolving the issue of boundaries rather than detracting from a title finding participates of the same logic.
40
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have when they were examined to see whether they “fit” a common law
right. An example of the central role of Indigenous intellectual resources
in the inquiry into their control over the land is provided by the trial
judge in Tsilhqot’in, Vickers J. In his careful examination of the
Tsilhqot’in conception of boundaries, he quotes the expert report at
length:
It is important to consider the issue of boundaries from the Aboriginal
perspective. …
.....
In Tsilhqot’in semi-nomadic society there were no boundaries in the
sense that a boundary is currently understood with reference to set
metes and bounds. In his discussion of Tsilhqot’in boundaries on p. 6
of his report, Dr. Brealy said:
‘Reconstructing boundaries of oral, relatively nomadic,
societies in a cartographic register is an exceedingly hazardous
undertaking, and never the more so than in the Chilcotin
country. To begin with, boundary construction in such
societies is, by definition, rather more a ‘social’, than it is a
‘geographical’, exercise. In oral societies, boundaries are
recognized, understood and validated not by maps and plans,
but from ‘inside the collective’ – i.e. by where creation
narratives fade, where genealogical linkages can no longer be
traced, where place names are not recognizable, and where
languages become unintelligible. Indigenous boundaries often
do trace, in metes and bounds fashion, defined watersheds,
creeks or lakes, but even then as much by ‘coincidence’ as
design and the lesser the degree of physiographic relief the
more ‘fuzzy’ boundaries tend to get.’42

Carefully postulating precise boundaries of title claim areas to
respond to what Vickers J. calls the “contemporary societal demand for
limits”43 will therefore be an exercise in determining the geographical
reach of a range of cultural elements  the creation narratives, place
names and language of the claimant group, and even more importantly,
its kinship ties and political allegiances. As discussed earlier, the
intention and capacity of the group to hold the land for its own purposes
have both a subjective and an objective component. Any evidence of
42
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2465, 2007 BCSC 1700,
at paras. 646 and 648 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in (B.C.S.C.)”].
43
Id., at para. 649.
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other Indigenous groups’ knowledge that the land belonged to the
claimant group, and their attitudes in light of that knowledge, will bolster
the latter’s title claim. In that regard, it is important to note that the
Supreme Court foregrounds the claimant group’s laws, their treaties with
other nations, and their enforcement policies:
Exclusivity should be understood in the sense of intention and capacity
to control the land. The fact that other groups or individuals were on
the land does not necessarily negate exclusivity of occupation. …
Exclusivity can be established by proof that others were excluded from
the land, or by proof that others were only allowed access to the land
with the permission of the claimant group. The fact that permission was
requested and granted or refused, or that treaties were made with other
groups, may show intention and capacity to control the land. Even the
lack of challenges to occupancy may support an inference of an
established group’s intention and capacity to control.44

I have thus discussed two implications of the clarification offered by
the Supreme Court concerning the standard of occupation at common
law, in particular regarding the fact that it turns on the proof of control
rather than on the use of land: aside from streamlining the test for title, it
equips Canadian Aboriginal law to take Indigenous political and legal
agency much more seriously  affirming a nation to nation relationship
between the Canadian state and Indigenous societies. I now conclude
with a third implication, which goes in the same direction. Shifting the
focus of Aboriginal title law from use to control puts an end not only to an
emerging double standard in the common law of private property (whereby
Indigenous claimant groups would have been held to a higher standard than
adverse possessors), but also to a longer-lived double standard in public
law, concerning the application of the notion of sovereignty. This notion,
usually examined by Canadian Courts in Aboriginal contexts for the
purpose of determining the date when it was asserted by the Crown in
different parts of the territory that incrementally became Canada, “involves
both a measure of settled occupation and a measure of administrative
control”45 but certainly not that the territory as a whole be physically
occupied, settled or used for any purpose at all.46 Associating the
44
Tsilhqot’in, supra, note 1, at para. 48. See also McNeil, “Exclusive Occupation”, supra,
note 11. This explains why I equate the notion of Indigenous control over territory that the Supreme
Court puts forward in Tsilhqot’in with de jure jurisdiction rather than with simple de facto control.
45
Tsilhqot’in (B.C.S.C.), supra, note 42, at para. 596, quoting Lambert J., in Delgamuukw
v. British Columbia, [1993] B.C.J. No. 1395, 104 D.L.R. (4th) 470 (B.C.C.A.).
46
See the discussion above, supra, note 7.
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occupation required to ground title with the intention and capacity to
control the land is thus not only correct in private property law, but is
also the right standard to apply in the realm of law that should be applied
in the first place to actual nations, as opposed to individual persons in the
domestic realm. Until that standard is properly applied to Indigenous
claimant groups, the Canadian state perpetuates the racist vision that
prevented the recognition of Indigenous nations as the equivalent of
nation states in the eyes of the European powers colonizing North
America, and produced the infamous proposition that the continent was
terra nullius until European powers asserted jurisdiction over it.47

II. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in still skirted the principle it has
reiterated since Delgamuukw, that “equal weight” should be given to
Euro-Canadian and Indigenous perspectives in the legal reasoning
leading up to the recognition and delineation of Aboriginal rights and
title. With respect to the title test, the Court merely clarified that the
standard of occupation that must be met to ground possessory title at
common law has to do with the intention and capacity to control the land,
rather than with the manner and use of the land in question. If evidence
concerning the manner and intensity of land use by the claimant group is
available, it can of course still be relied upon to show that the group held
the land for its own purposes, both in its own eyes and in the eyes of
other Indigenous groups48  but such proof is only subservient to the
demonstration of historical control. Proving “exclusive” occupation
should automatically fulfil the criterion of “sufficient” occupation, since
it is now clear that control underlies those two elements of the title test.
But this seemingly innocuous clarification of the common law of
possessory title has poised Canadian Aboriginal law to give effect to a
much more egalitarian, nation-to-nation relationship between Indigenous
47
See McNeil, “Indigenous Nations”, supra, note 7; Borrows, supra, note 10; Robert J. Miller,
Jacinta Ruru, Larissa Behrendt & Tracey Lindberg, Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of
Discovery in the English Colonies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); and Felix Hoehn,
Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal Nations and Canada (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan
Native Law Centre, 2012). See also Kent McNeil’s critical essay reviewing those two books,
forthcoming in the Osgoode Hall Law Journal.
48
This approach might be advantageous to Aboriginal groups that would find it more
challenging to prove their laws at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty than to show their
regular use of the land through relevant “practices, customs and traditions” at that period of their
history.
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nations and the settler state. Indeed, affirming that the title test rests on
the proof of control puts the issue of Indigenous territories’ boundaries,
and therefore of Indigenous nations’ recognition of each other’s authority
and jurisdiction over their respective territories, at the forefront of the
legal inquiry. It effectively places Indigenous normativity  treaties
between neighbouring Indigenous nations, permissions granted, denied
or skirted to enter a group’s territory  at the heart of Canadian law.
This not only averts the creation of a double standard within the common
law of private property, but more importantly, it may finally signal the
end of a long-lived double standard in Canadian public law and at
international law, whereby the sovereignty of European nations rests on
the intention and capacity to control a vast expanse of territory  while
the ownership and jurisdiction of Indigenous nations over territories they
have occupied for time immemorial is altogether denied, or made to
depend on more stringent criteria such as the regular use of those lands.

